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Abstract
The polarization phenomenon for a single source is extended to a framework with multiple
correlated sources. It is shown in addition to extracting the randomness of the source, the polar
transforms takes the original arbitrary dependencies to extremal dependencies. Polar coding
schemes for the Slepian-Wolf problem and for secret key generations are then proposed based on
this phenomenon. In particular, constructions of secret keys achieving the secrecy capacity and
compression schemes achieving the Slepian-Wolf capacity region are obtained with a complexity
of O(n log(n)).
1 Introduction
The polarization technique has been developed in [8] for channel coding and then in [9] for source
coding. The codes resulting from this technique, called polar codes, have several desirable at-
tributes: (1) they have low encoding and decoding complexity (2) bounds on the error probability
which are exponential in the square root of the block length are obtained (3) they allow to achieve
the Shannon capacity on symmetric discrete memoryless channels.
One of the key results in the development of polar codes is the following ‘polarization phe-
nomenon’. For a matrix A, we denote by A⊗k the matrix obtained by taking k Kronecker products
of A with itself.
Theorem 1. [8, 9] Let Xn = [X1, . . . ,Xn] be i.i.d. Bernoulli(p), n be a power of 2, and Y
n =
XnGn, where Gn =
[
1 0
1 1
]⊗ log2(n) and where the addition is modulo 2. Then, for any ε ∈ (0, 1),
|{j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : H(Yj|Y j−1) ∈ (ε, 1− ε)}| = o(n). (1)
Here H(Yj|Y j−1) denotes the conditional Shannon entropy of Yj given the previous components
Y j−1 = [Y1, . . . , Yj−1]. Note that (1) implies that, besides for a vanishing fraction, all conditional
entropies H(Yj |Y j−1) tend to either 0 and 1. This explains the name of ‘polarization phenomenon’.
Moreover, since Gn is invertible, the total entropy in X
n and Y n is the same,
nH(p) = H(Xn) = H(Y n), (2)
∗This paper was presented at ITA 2010 [1], while the secrecy application was presented at the Allerton Conference
on Communication, Control and Computing, Monticello, October 2011. The author is now with the Electrical En-
gineering Department and Program in Applied and Computational Mathematics at Princeton University, Princeton,
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n
|{j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : H(Yj|Y j−1) ≥ 1− ε}| n→∞−→ H(p), (3)
1
n
|{j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : H(Yj|Y j−1) ≤ ε}| n→∞−→ 1−H(p), (4)
where H(p) is the entropy of the Bernoulli(p) distribution.
In view of previous result, the transformGn has a clear advantage for compressing the sourceX
n:
by mappingXn to Y n the compression is done by storing only the components with high conditional
entropy (or more precisely with non-low conditional entropy) and the resulting compression rate
is optimal since it is the entropy. The probability of decoding wrongly a bit which has not been
stored, using the stored bits, can be seen to be at most its conditional entropy, i.e., at most ε. See
Section 1.1 for details about this. Since it shown in [9] that ε can be taken exponentially small in the
square root of the blocklength while preserving the polarization theorem above, error propagation
can be prevented with a successive decoding algorithm, and the above gives a linear source code
with a structured matrix Gn for which the encoding and decoding complexity in O(n log n) [8].
In addition to the above, the polarization technique has proved to admit generalizations to
several multi-user problems. In [26, 5] a generalization is proposed for multiple access channels.
The polar coding technique is also used in [18] for relay channels and in [19, 16] for broadcast
channels. It is used in [17, 20, 7, 21] for the wire-tap channel, ensuring weak secrecy, besides for
noiseless main channels where strong secrecy can be achieved [21]. In [19, 9, 1] the Slepian-Wolf
coding problem is considered with polar codes. The approach of [19, 9] is based on the onion-pealing
decoding of the users, while in [1] joint decoding of the multiple users’ inputs. The joint decoding
approach was also used in [26, 5] for the MAC. In subsequent works, generalizations are obtained
for non binary alphabets [25] and for non corner points of the rate region in [10].
This paper develops the results presented first by the author in [1] and provides polar coding
schemes for the m-user Slepian-Wolf coding problem. In this setting, multiple users have a source
sequence and the goal is to compress the multiple sources in a distributed manner while exploiting
the correlation among the sources (details about this problem are provided in Section 3). The
key step to establish polar coding schemes for the Slepian-Wolf problem is to extend Theorem 1
to a setting where there is not a single source sequence Xn, but multiple sources sequences Xn[i]
for a set of users indexed by i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. There are different strategies for that purpose: one
may treat each user sequentially, this is the onion-pealing approach which leads to corner points
of the achievable rate region, or jointly, to reach rates on the dominant face of the achievable rate
region. The onion-pealing approach is developed in [19, 9], this paper provides the joint approach.
The paper then expands the technique to the secret key generation problem in the multi-terminal
setting with no side-information, which has not been considered with neither the onion-pealing nor
joint approach so far1. It is shown that the resulting coding schemes retain the desirable properties
of polar codes. For the Slepian-Wolf (SW) coding problem, capacity-boundary rates are achieved
with low-complexity complexity if the number of users is fixed. While in [1] for the SW problem
and in [26, 5] for the MAC problem, the joint approach typically leads to a gap in the achievable
rate region, a condition on the source distribution (separability) is introduced in this paper to
ensure achievability of individual rates without gap. For the secret key generation problem, two
protocols are presented affording weak secrecy, which can be converted to strong secrecy by relying
1Preliminary results were presented in [3]
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on a random seed of size o(n), at the optimal secrecy rate and with O(n log(n)) complexity. The
technique is also shown to extend to secret key agreement with more than two parties. In each
of these applications, the proposed coding schemes are among the first to reach the information
theoretic limits with O(n log(n)) encoding and decoding complexity.
We introduce next some notation:
• [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}
• F2 denotes the binary field (GF (2))
• For x ∈ Fk2 and S ⊆ [k], x[S] = {xi : i ∈ S}
• For x ∈ Fk2 , xi = [x1, . . . , xi]
• Z ± ε denotes the set of real numbers within distance ε of an integer, and Z3 ± ε the set of
3-dimensional real vectors within distance ε of a 3-dimensional integral vector
• For a probability distribution µ on Fm2 and S ⊆ [m], µS denotes the marginal of µ on S.
1.1 Comment on entropy extraction
We discuss here the implication of extracting the Shannon entropy in a random source, with respect
to reconstructing the source. In particular, this explains why the polarization phenomenon in
Theorem 1 implies a lossless source code.
We first define the min-entropy.
Definition 1. Let X,Y be random variables taking values in the discrete sets X ,Y respectively.
The conditional min-entropy of X given Y is given by
H∞(X|Y ) =
∑
y∈Y
H(X|Y = y) Pr{Y = y}, (5)
where
H∞(X|Y = y) = min
x∈X
log
1
Pr{X = x|Y = y} . (6)
Note that H∞(X|Y = y) ≤ H(X|Y = y), hence H∞(X|Y ) ≤ H(X|Y ), where H denotes the
Shannon-entropy.
Define next a (µ, ε)-compressor as follows.
Definition 2. Let µ be a probability distribution on Fn2 and let X ∼ µ. A deterministic map
f : Fn2 → Fm2 is a (µ, ε)-compressor if H∞(X|f(X)) ≤ ε. A linear compressor is a compressor for
which f is linear.
A compressor preserves all the information about X in f(X) in the following sense.
Lemma 1. f : Fn2 → Fm2 is a (µ, ε)-compressor then there exists an algorithm recovering X ∼ µ
from f(X) with average error probability at most 1−e−ε = ε+o(ε). Conversely, if for f : Fn2 → Fm2
there exists an algorithm recovering X ∼ µ from f(X) with average error probability at most ε,
then f is a (µ, δ)-compressor with δ =
√
εm+ o(
√
εm).
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The proof of this lemma is given in Section 6.
Consider now the map g : Fn2 → Fm2 given by Gn[Dε,n(p)c, ·] (i.e., keep the rows in Gn indexed
by [n] \Dε,n(p)), where
Dε,n(p) := {i ∈ [n] : H(Yi|Y i−1) ≤ ε}, (7)
and where Y n = GnX
n, with Xn i.i.d. Bernoulli(p) as in previous section. Then Theorem 1 says
that g is a εn-compressor for an i.i.d. Bernoulli source, indeed,
H(Xn|Gn[Dε,n(p)c, ·]Xn) = H(Y n|Y n[Dε,n(p)c]) (8)
= H(Y n[Dε,n(p)]|Y n[Dε,n(p)c]) (9)
≤
∑
i∈Dε,n(p)
H(Yi|Y i−1) (10)
≤ εn. (11)
Hence, if ε = o(1/n) (and in fact ε can be taken exponentially small for polar codes), we have
that Gn[Dε,n(p)
c, ·] is a o(1)-compressor and by Lemma 1, Xn can be recovered with probability
1−o(1). In the case of polar codes, Xn can be recovered with a successive decoding algorithms that
requires only O(n log(n)) computations, as opposed to MAP (as used in the proof of the Lemma)
which is a priori of exponential complexity.
Note also that in the case of an i.i.d. Bernoulli(p) source, the least dimension m to obtain a
o(1)-compressor is m = nH(p) + o(n), i.e., the compressor must extract all the Shannon entropy.
Note that the only source with binary components whose dimension is equal to its entropy is a
uniformly distributed source, while here the compressed source f(X) must have dimension matching
approximately its total entropy, up to a o(n). Hence f is not necessarily an extractor as f(X)
may still contain some components that are not close to uniformly distributed. For example,
in the polar construction, Gn[Dε,n(p)
c, ·]Xn contains also the “moderate” components that have
conditional entropy H(Yi|Y i−1) ∈ (ε, 1−ε), and are hence non-uniform. However, modulo removing
a vanishing fraction of components, f can be made an extractor, e.g., Gn[Rε,n(p), ·] is an extractor
for Rε,n(p) := {i ∈ [n] : H(Yi|Y i−1) ≥ 1− ε}, as shown in [4].
1.2 Comment on the use of the bit-reversal matrix
The transformation used [8, 9] is not Gn but GnBn, where Bn is the bit-reversal permutation (i.e.,
the permutation that maps each element of j ∈ {1, . . . , n} to the element j˜ obtained by reversing
the binary expansion2 of j.) We clarify here why Bn is not necessary for obtaining Theorem 1, but
is simply convenient to prove the result. In fact, the probability distributions of Y n = XnGn and
Y˜ n = XnGnBn are the same when X
n is i.i.d. Bernoulli(p), in particular
H(Yj|Y j−1) = H(Y˜j|Y˜ j−1), ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (12)
To see this, observe that Gn and Bn commute. This is easily seen by expressing the components
of Gn as Boolean functions of the row and column index (in binary expansions), namely, for a, b ∈
{0, 1}log2 n, where a represent the row index and b the column index, Gn(a, b) =
∏n
i=1(1+(ai+1)bi),
2One should consider here j in {0, . . . , n− 1} rather that {1, . . . , n}.
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where the addition is modulo 2. Therefore, reversing the order of the {ai}’s or the order of the {bi}’s
leads to the same matrix. Since Bn and Gn commute, and since BnX
n has the same distribution
as Xn, namely i.i.d. Bernoulli(p), the equality (12) follows.
The reason why Bn might be preferred in polar coding is that the “recursive” nature of the
polarization process may be more easily described with Bn. To see this, consider n = 4, and
G4 =

1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1
 , (13)
Y 4 = X4G4 and Y˜
4 = (Y1, Y3, Y2, Y4). Observe that Y˜
4 can be constructed recursively as follows:
Define
V1 = X1 +X2, V2 = X2 (14)
W1 = X3 +X4, W2 = X4. (15)
Then
Y˜1 = V1 +W1, Y˜2 =W1 (16)
Y˜3 = V2 +W2, Y˜4 =W2. (17)
If one does not use the bit-reversal, the following is obtained,
Y1 = V1 +W1, Y2 = V2 +W2, (18)
Y3 =W1, Y4 =W2. (19)
Hence the recursion is seen differently, in Y˜ 4, two consecutive components are connected by G2,
whereas in Y 4, two alternating components are connected by G2. Yet, as shown by (12), the two
orderings lead to the same conditional entropies, this is simply seen here by noting that Y2 = X2+X4
and Y3 = X3+X4 can be swapped up to a relabelling of the components. To perform the decoding
algorithm recursively in O(n log n), it is usually more convenient to use the bit-reversal at the
encoder or decoder.
2 Results
A joint polarization phenomenon for correlated sources is now presented. Implications of this result
for the Slepian-Wolf coding and secret key generation problems are next presented.
2.1 Matrix polarization
Theorem 2. Let m be a positive integer, n be a power of 2 and Xn be an m× n random matrix
with i.i.d. columns of distribution µ on Fm2 . Let Y
n = XnGn over F2, where Gn =
[
1 0
1 1
]⊗ log2(n).
• For any ε > 0,
|{i ∈ [n] : H(Yi[S]|Y i−1) /∈ Z± ε, for any S ⊆ [m]}| = o(n).
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• For any ε > 0, for any i ∈ [n], there exists Ai ∈ Fm×m2 such that
H(AiYi|Y i−1) ≤ ε, 1
n
n∑
j=1
nullity(Aj)
n→∞→ H(µ).
• Previous statement hold when ε = O(2−nβ ), β < 1/2.
The above is a counter-part in the source setting of the results established in [5] for MACs.
The proof is slightly more direct in the source setting, since there is no freezing of the noisy
components to be done. Moreover, the scheme is entirely deterministic in the source setting (there
is no randomisation of the frozen components).
The first item in the theorem says that for all i but a vanishing fraction, the conditional
entropies H(Yi[S]|Y i−1) take near-integer values for all S. In particular, one would like to conclude
that there is a set S of maximal cardinality for which H(Yi[S]|Y i−1) = H(Yi|Y i−1) is close to |S|,
which implies that the components Yi[S] are roughly i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2) and that Yi[S
c] is roughly
deterministic given Y i−1 and Yi[S]. This is implied by the second item, which gives even more
information on the structure of Yi. The second item says that there is a transformation (the matrix
Ai) which turns the components of Yi into a lower-dimensional almost deterministic random vector
(given the past components). Of course it is always possible to find such a transformation Ai, e.g.,
pick the 0 matrix. However, the second condition in item 2 implies that this is achieved without
loosing any information, i.e., preserving all the entropy of the original random matrix. This linear
structure also shows that there are various ways to chose the components of Yi that are random or
deterministic, and the alternatives are governed by the structure of Ai, since there may be various
ways to select a set of independent columns in Ai.
2.2 Compression results
Theorem 2 can be used in various compression settings, in particular to compress sources which
have finite field alphabets or which have finite memory, as shown in [1].
Remark 1. It easy to see how this can be achieved. If the source has finite memory, group the
components which are independent to create a matrix Xn which has independent columns as in
Theorem 2. Compression is then obtained by retaining only the high entropy components in Y n.
For the case of source with alphabet cardinality 2m, apply the matrix Gn to the source with the
GF (2m) field addition. The theorem then leads to a generalized notion of polarization where the
2m-bit components Yi are not uniform or deterministic, but have subsets of components (looking
at Yi as an elements of GF (2)
m) which are uniform or deterministic. More details about these
approaches can be found in [1, 5].
We provide now results for the Slepian-Wolf problem using the coding scheme introduced in
Section 3. Further details about the Slepian-Wolf coding problem are also provided in Section 3.
The following definition is needed.
Definition 3. A probability distribution µ on Fm2 is separable in S if for (X[1], . . . ,X[m]) ∼ µ,
there exist a linear map F : F
m−|S|
2 → F|S|2 and a random variable W [S] independent of X[Sc] such
that
X[S] = F (X[Sc]) +W [S]. (20)
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For example, if m = 2, X1 is uniform and X2 = X1 + Z where Z is independent of X1 but
otherwise arbitrary, then µ is separable in both components. Another case is when F is identically
0, then X[S] and X[Sc] are independent, a strong case of separability.
Theorem 3. Let m ≥ 1 be fixed. Let n a power of 2, and let Xn[1], . . . ,Xn[m] be m sources
with (Xi[1], . . . ,Xi[m])
n
i=1 i.i.d. under µ on F
m
2 . The coding scheme of Section 3 allows to achieve
distributed compression of the m sources at total sum-rate H(µ), error probability O(2−n
β
), β < 1/2,
and encoding/decoding complexity of O(n log n). Further, if µ is separable in S ⊆ [m], the encoders
in S achieve the sum-rate on S, namely H(X1[S]|X1[Sc]).
Theorem 3 always ensures achievability of the sum-rate of all users, however the sum-rate on
subsets of users is in general not achieved. How much of the rate region is lost in the general case
remains an open problem.
2.3 Secrecy results
We provide in this section the performance achieved with the two protocols presented in Section 4.
The first protocol uses the onion-pealing polarization [9] whereas the second protocol uses Theorem
3. Further details about the secret key generation setting are also provided in Section 4.
Theorem 4. Let Alice observe Xn and Bob observe Y n such that (Xn, Y n)
iid∼ µ, where µ is a
probability distribution over F2×F2. The polar-key-1 and polar-key-2 protocols described in Section
4 allow Alice and Bob to generate respectively private keys Sn and S
′
n using public communication
3
Cn such that for any β < 1/2 and n large enough
P{Sn 6= S′n} = o(2−n
β
), (21)
I(Sn;Cn) = o(n), (22)
H(Sn)
{
= nI(µ) + o(n), for polar-key-1,
≥ n12I(µ) + o(n), for polar-key-2,
(23)
where I(µ) = I(X1;Y1). The protocols require one communication round and their computational
complexity is O(n log(n)).
Remark 2. The theorem says that Alice and Bob can w.h.p. agree on a secret key of rate I(µ)
which leaks o(n) bits of information to an eavesdropper who listens to the public communication.
This provides weak secrecy. The difficulty in achieving strong secrecy lies in the fact that for secret
key agreement, the reliability of the key construction relies on transmitting the non-low entropy
components whereas the secrecy relies on hiding the non-high entropy components. However there
are o(n) fluctuating components in the polarization phenomenon which are in neither camp and
hence compromise either reliability (block error probability) or strong secrecy. On the other hand,
if these o(n) components are securely transmitted, e.g., using a one-time pad, then strong secrecy
is achieved using the previous protocols. Another alternative to achieving strong secrecy is via
privacy amplification [13].
The two protocols afford several desirable attributes:
3Public communication is assumed to take place over a noiseless channel.
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1. the computational complexity is O(n log n)
2. the key construction is deterministic
3. the information-theoretic limit is achieved (for any distribution µ with the first protocol and
for some4 distributions µ with the second protocol).
The second protocol provides a different approach for secret key agreement, as it performs the
decoding differently. The variation is of interest for the error-probability performance, since bits
are decoded jointly rather than with the onion-pealing approach, we expect the finite block length
performance to be different. We also provide extensions to secret key agreement with more than
two parties.
3 Compression
The Slepian-Wolf coding problem consists in compressing correlated sources without the encoders
cooperating after the code agreement. Let X1, . . . ,Xn be i.i.d. under µ on F
m
2 , i.e., Xi is an m
dimensional binary random vector and X1[i], . . . ,Xn[i] is the sources output for user i. Encoding
these sources by having access to all the realizations requires a rate H(µ) (and it is the lowest
achievable rate). In [27], Slepian and Wolf showed that, even if the encoders are not able to
cooperate while observing the source realizations, lossless compression can still be achieved at sum
rate H(µ).
In [9, 19], polar codes are used for the two-user Slepian-Wolf coding problem by reducing the
problem to single-user source coding problems, using “onion-pealing decoding” and hence achieving
a corner point of the rate region. The method is based on the following extension of (1),
1
n
|{j ∈ [n] : H(Yj [1]|Y j−1[1], Y n[2]) ≥ 1− ε}| (24)
n→∞−→ H(X[1]|X[2]), (25)
where (X[1],X[2]) ∼ µ. This means that conditioning on the entire random vector Y n[2], the
first random vector polarizes. The joint approach is also partly discussed in a preliminary version
of [9] for two correlated sources. We now present how to use Theorem 2 to achieve rates on the
dominant-face jointly for arbitrarily many users.
From Theorem 2, we can associate to each component j ∈ [n] a matrix Aj such that
H(AjYj |Y j−1) ≤ ε.
If Aj has rank rj, by revealing kj = m− rj components in Yj appropriately, denoted by Bj ⊆ [m],
we have that AjYj can be reduced to a full rank matrix multiplication A˜jYj[B
c
j ] plus an almost
deterministic vector. There may be several choices of Bj that work, as there may be several subsets
of columns in the matrix Aj which have full rank. Any choice works for achieving the sum-rate.
Now, Yj[B
c
j ] is almost deterministic given Y
j−1 and Yj[Bj ]. Hence the number of bits to reveal
is exactly
∑
j kj , and as stated in the lemma, this corresponds to the total entropy of Y (up to a
o(n)).
4This is the case for example when X and Y are connected by a BSC
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Definition 4. For ε > 0 and i ∈ [n], let Ai be a matrix as in Theorem 2. Select Bi = Bi,ε ⊆ [m]
such that |Bi| has maximal cardinality and such that the columns of Ai indexed by Bi are linearly
independent. For k ∈ [m], define B[k] = Bε[k] to be the subset of [n] containing the indices j for
which k ∈ Bj .
Polar codes for distributed data compression:
1. For a given n and ε (which sets the error probability), the users agree on a “chart” of deterministic
indices, i.e., B[k] for user k as in Definition 4.
2. For k ∈ [m], user k computes Y [k] = X[k]Gn and transmit YBε[k]c[k] to the decoder.
3. The decoder, in possession of YBε[k]c[k] for every k ∈ [m], runs polar-matrix-decoder to get Y .
Since Gn is invertible, G
−1
n = Gn, the decoder finds X = Y Gn.
Definition 5. polar-matrix-decoder
Inputs: for k ∈ [m], B[k] ⊆ [n] and yB[k][k] ∈ F|B[k]|2 .
Output: y ∈ Fm×n2 .
Algorithm:
For j = 1, . . . , n, let Bcj = {k : j /∈ B[k]}, if Bcj is not empty, compute
yˆ[Bcj ] = arg max
u∈F
|Bc
j
|
2
P{Y [Bcj ] = u|Y j−1 = yj−1, Y [Bj ] = y[Bj ]}.
Remark 3. The results in this paper may hold when m = o(n), but one has to be careful with
the complexity scaling when m gets large. An interesting question is to investigate whether the
decoding complexity can be brought down from 2m logm to m with the joint decoding. This is
possible if the source is separable in all components, as in the example of Section 2.2.
It would also be interesting to study the gap in the marginal rates of the capacity region
achieved with the joint approach. In a subsequent work, [10] proposes an alternative approach
to reach arbitrary rates on the dominant faces. The approach does not rely on a polarization of
the rate region but on variations of the entropy chain-rules. It remains an open problem to find
a method to polarize the entire rate region into extremal rate regions without loosing individual
rates. We next show that such a decomposition, irrespectively of the polar coding technique, is
possible when m ≤ 3, but may not be achievable for any distribution when m ≥ 4.
Definition 6. For a probability distribution µ on a finite set, define ρµ to be the 2
m-dimensional
real vector formed by the collection of numbers ρµ(S) = H(X[S]|X[Sc]), where S ⊆ [m] and
X[1, . . . ,m] ∼ µ. We call such vectors Slepian-Wolf vectors.
Proposition 1. For m ≤ 3, ρµ can always be expressed as a positive weighted sum of extremal
Slepian-Wolf vectors generated by a linear form as in Theorem 2. For m ≥ 4, there exist distribu-
tions µ for which the decomposition is not possible.
Proof of Proposition 1. Note that ρµ(S) = H(X[S]|X[Sc]) = H(µ) − H(X[Sc]). For a fixed µ,
consider the entropic vectors whose components are given by the entropies H(X[S]) for all S ⊆ [m].
Define a polymatroid vector f on a ground set [m] to be a positive vector of length 2m where the
components f(S), indexed by subsets S ⊆ [m], satisfy
f(∅) = 0, (26)
f(J) ≤ f(K), ∀J ⊆ K ⊆ [m], (27)
f(J ∪K) + f(J ∩K) ≤ f(J) + f(K), ∀J,K ⊆ [m]. (28)
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Note that since f(∅) = 0 by definition, we will only specify the 2m − 1 components of a polyma-
troid/entropic vector which correspond to the non-empty sets in what follows. Denoting by Γ∗m the
set of all possible entropic vectors on m random variables, and by Γm the set of all polymatroid
vectors on a ground set [m], it is know from Theorem 2 page 1984 in [28] that Γ¯∗3 = Γ3. Moreover,
Γ3 is a convex cone whose extreme rays are given by
m1 = (1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1), m2 = (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1),
m3 = (0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1), m4 = (1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1),
m5 = (1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1), m6 = (0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1),
m7 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1), m8 = (1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2),
where the above vectors correspond to
(H(X1),H(X2),H(X3),H(X1,X2),H(X1,X3),H(X2,X3),H(X1,X2,X3)).
These can be checked to be the only extreme rays, using the characterization of extreme rays
in Section 10.4.B of [23] or from [14]. Note that (1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3) is not an extreme ray since it
corresponds tom1+m2+m3. Now, any entropic vector can be expressed as a positive weighted sum
of extreme rays, which in this case can be checked to be all equivalent to the rank vector of a matrix
(where a rank vector is defined by r(S) = rank(A[S]), S ⊆ [m]). For example, (1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1) is
the rank vector of
(
1 0 0
)
and (1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2) is the rank vector of
(
1 0 1
0 1 1
)
.
For m ≥ 4, Γ¯∗m ( Γm. In particular, for m = 4, there exists an extreme ray
(1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2)
which is an entropic vector but which is not a rank function. It is an entropic vector by defining
Z1, Z2, Z3 i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2) and X1 := Z1, X2 := Z2, X3 := Z1 + Z2 and X4 := (Z1, Z2). It is
not a rank function since r(4) > 1.
4 Secrecy
We now consider the problem of information-theoretic secret key agreement. We focus first on a
basic setting: Alice observes privately Xn and Bob observes privately Y n, where (Xi, Yi) are i.i.d.
from a distribution µ over F2 × F2. Using public communication, Alice and Bob want to agree
on a secret key which has largest possible rate. Denoting by C the communication between Alice
and Bob and S the secret key, we would like I(S;C) to be small. If I(S;C) → 0, strong secrecy
is achieved, if 1nI(S;C) → 0, weak secrecy is achieved. It is known from [6, 22] that the secrecy
capacity for this setting is I(µ) = I(X1;Y1). We now introduce the polar code protocols.
4.1 First protocol
Definition 7. For ε > 0, n ≥ 1 and µ a probability distribution on F2 × F2, the following sets are
defined
Rε,n(X) := {i ∈ [n] : H(Ui|U i−1) ≥ ε}, (29)
Rε,n(X|Y ) := {i ∈ [n] : H(Ui|U i−1, V n) ≥ ε}, (30)
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where Un := XnGn, V
n := Y nGn, Gn =
[
1 0
1 1
]⊗ log2(n), (Xn, Y n) iid∼ µ.
Polar-key-1 protocol. The protocol is defined for a given distribution µ on F2 × F2 (the distri-
bution correlating the inputs of Alice and Bob) and a given n ≥ 1, β ∈ (0, 1/2).
Alice input: xn ∈ Fn2 , ε ∈ (0, 1), µ. Alice output: sn.
Bob input: yn ∈ Fn2 , ε ∈ (0, 1), µ. Bob output: s′n.
Let ε := 2−n
β
.
(1) Alice computes un = xnGn and sends u
n[Rε,n(X|Y )] to Bob using public communication and
sets sn = u
n[R1−ε,n(X) \Rε,n(X|Y )] (cf. definition 7).
(2) Bob computes uˆn from un[Rε,n(X|Y )] and yn using the decoding algorithm in [9] Section III
and sets s′n = uˆ
n[R1−ε,n(X) \Rε,n(X|Y )].
4.2 Second protocol
Definition 8. For ε > 0, n ≥ 1 and µ a probability distribution on F2 × F2, the following sets are
defined
Rε,n(X) := {i ∈ [n] : H(Ui|U i−1) ≥ ε}, (31)
Qε,n(X|Y ) := {i ∈ [n] : Hi /∈ Z3 ± ε} ∪ {i ∈ [n] : Hi ∈ {(1, 0, 1), (1, 1, 2)} ± ε} (32)
where Un := XnGn, V
n := Y nGn, Gn =
[
1 0
1 1
]⊗ log2(n), (Xn, Y n) iid∼ µ, and
Hi = [H(Ui|U i−1, V i−1, Vi),H(Vi|U i−1, V i−1, Ui),H(Ui, Vi|U i−1, V i−1)]. (33)
Note that Qε,n(X|Y ) contains the components which are not polarized or which have high
conditional entropy in the U vector for Bob.
Polar-key-2 protocol. The protocol is defined for a given distribution µ on F2×F2 (the distribu-
tion correlating the inputs of Alice and Bob) and a given n ≥ 1, β ∈ (0, 1/2). Before the protocol
starts, the two parties identify the marginal rates (R1, R2) achieved with Theorem 2 and find the
maximum between R1 −H(X1|Y1) and R2 −H(Y1|X1). If the maximum of these two terms is the
second term, invert the role of Alice and Bob in the following protocol.
Alice input: xn ∈ Fn2 , ε ∈ (0, 1), µ. Alice output: sn.
Bob input: yn ∈ Fn2 , ε ∈ (0, 1), µ. Bob output: s′n.
Let ε := 2−n
β
.
(1) Alice computes un = xnGn and sends u
n[Qε,n(X|Y )] to Bob using public communication and
sets sn = u
n[R1−ε,n(X) \Qε,n(X|Y )] (cf. definition 8).
(2) Bob computes uˆn from un[Qε,n(X|Y )] and yn using the decoding algorithm in [1] and sets
s′n = uˆ
n[R1−ε,n(X) \Qε,n(X|Y )].
Remark 4. The two protocols provide different secret key rates, since the rates achieved by Theorem
2 are not necessarily the entire rate region of the Slepian-Wolf coding problem, whereas [9] always
achieves a corner point of the region. Note however that, as opposed to the Slepian-Wolf coding
problem where the decoder needs to decode the second-user sequence vn into an estimate vˆn, in
the secret-key generation problem, Bob is already in possession of true sequence vn. Therefore, the
first protocol may not only be sub-optimal in terms of rate but it is also worse in terms of error
probability, as it does not make use of the future values of vn in the decoding algorithm. Note,
however, that the second protocol decodes the components of un and vn causally without requiring
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the future of vn. For the Slepian-Wolf coding problem the difference is notable, since vn is not
known but estimated by the decoder, and in fact the onion-pealing decoding of un from vˆn appears
to be more sensitive to error propagations than the joint decoding approach at finite block length
[24]. However, for secrecy, the second protocol is mainly a toy application of Theorem 2.
4.3 Extensions
4.3.1 Side-information
One can assume that Eve receives side-information Zn about Xn, Y n. In the case where Zn is i.i.d.
and stochastically degraded form Y n, such that Xn − Y n − Zn form a Markov chain, the above
protocols can be modified to generate secret keys. For example for the first protocol, require Alice
to send the components of Un such that H(Ui|U i−1, Y n) ≥ ε. Eve has now Zn, however by the
Markov property
H(Ui|U i−1, Zn) ≥ H(Ui|U i−1, Zn, Y n) = H(Ui|U i−1, Y n)
hence the high entropy components are nested and previous expansions apply, using for the key the
components with high conditional entropy H(Ui|U i−1, Zn) which are missing to Eve. Note that
for the case where Eve has degraded side-information, one may consider the special case for which
X = Y , in this case strong secrecy is directly achieved with previous expansions.
4.3.2 Three terminals
We now consider5 the case of three terminals. Let Xn, Y n, Zn be i.i.d. from a known distribution
on F32 and assume that X
n = Y n + An and Zn = Y n + Bn, where An, Bn are independent with,
say, H(A1) ≤ H(B1). Hence there exists ∆n independent of An such that Bn = An + ∆n. One
obtains
H(Vi|V i−1, Zn) = H(Vi|V i−1, Y n +An +∆n) ≥ H(Vi|V i−1, Y n +An) = H(Vi|V i−1,Xn).
Hence, the terminal having Y sends the components for which H(Vi|V i−1, Zn) ≥ ε to the two other
terminals. Since these components contain the components for which H(Vi|V i−1,Xn) ≥ ε, both
terminals can recover Y and generate a secret key of rate I(Y ;Z) = min(I(X;Y ), I(Y ;Z)), which
is optimal according to [15].
5 Proofs
5.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Lemma 2. For any ε > 0, we have,
1
n
|{j ∈ [n] : H(Yj[S]|Y j−1) ∈ Z± ε,∀S ⊆ [m]}|
→ 1
5While this manuscript was under review, further work on secrete key generation with polar coding was proposed
in [12].
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In order to prove Lemma 2, we need the following definition and lemmas.
Definition 9. For a random vector V distributed over Fm2 , define V
− = V + V ′ and V + = V ′,
where V ′ is an i.i.d. copy of V . Let {bi}i≥1 be i.i.d. binary random variables uniformly distributed
in {−,+}. Denote by V b1...bk the iteration of the + and − operations on V . Let
ηk[S] = H(V
b1...bk [S]|V c1...ck ,∀(c1 . . . ck) < (b1 . . . bk))
for S ⊆ [m], where the order between (−,+)-sequences is the lexicographic order with − < + (for
example −+ < +−).
Note that
{V b1...bk : (b1 . . . bk) ∈ {−,+}k} (d)= XG2k
where X is the matrix whose columns are i.i.d copies of V . The following lemma explains the
previous definition.
Lemma 3. Using V ∼ µ in the definition of ηk[S], we have for any n and any set D ⊆ [0, |S|]
1
n
|{j ∈ [n] : H(Yj [S]|Y j−1) ∈ D}| = P{ηlog2(n)[S] ∈ D}.
The proof is a direct consequence from the fact that the bk’s are i.i.d. uniform. Using the
invertibility of
[
1 0
1 1
]
and properties of the conditional entropy, we have the following.
Lemma 4. ηk[S] is a super-martingale with respect to bk for any S ⊆ [m] and a martingale for
S = [m].
Proof. For n = 2, we have
2H(X1[S]) = H(X1[S]X2[S]])
= H(Y1[S]Y2[S])
= H(Y1[S]) +H(Y2[S]|Y1[S])
≥ H(Y1[S]) +H(Y2[S]|Y1) (34)
with equality in (34) if S = [m]. For n ≥ 2, the same expansion holds including in the conditioning
the appropriate “past” random variables.
Note that because ηk[S] is a martingale for S = [m], the sum-rate H(µ) is conserved through
the polarization process. Now, using the previous lemma and the fact that ηk[S] ∈ [0, |S|] for any
S, the martingale convergence theorem implies the following.
Corollary 1. For any S ⊆ [m], ηk[S] converges almost surely.
The following allows to characterize possible values of the process ηk[S] when it converges.
Lemma 5. For any ε > 0, X valued in Fm2 , Z arbitrary, (X
′, Z ′) an i.i.d. copy of (X,Z), S ⊆ [m],
there exists δ = δ(ε) such that H(X ′[S]|Z ′)−H(X ′[S]|Z,Z ′,X[S]+X ′[S]) ≤ δ implies H(X ′[S]|Z ′)−
H(X ′[S \ i]|Z ′) ∈ {0, 1} ± ε for any i ∈ S.
13
Proof. We have
H(X ′[S]|Z ′)−H(X ′[S]|Z,Z ′,X[S] +X ′[S])
= I(X ′[S];X[S] +X ′[S]|Z,Z ′)
≥ I(X ′[S];X[i] +X ′[i]|Z,Z ′,X[S \ i] +X ′[S \ i])
≥ I(X ′[i];X[i] +X ′[i]|Z,Z ′,X[S \ i] +X ′[S \ i],X ′[S \ i])
= H(X ′[i]|Z ′,X ′[S \ i])−H(X ′[i]|Z,Z ′,X[S \ i],X ′[S \ i],X[i] +X ′[i]). (35)
The point of previous expansions is to bring the expression appearing in a one-step polarization
transform of a scalar (or single-user) source. It is shown in [9] that if A1, A2 are binary ran-
dom variables and B1, B2 are valued in arbitrary sets such that PA1A2B1B2(a1, a2, b1, b2) = P (a1 +
a2)P (a2)Q(b1|a1+a2)Q(b2|a2), for some conditional probability distribution Q and binary probabil-
ity distribution P , then, for any a > 0, there exists b > 0 such that H(A2|B2)−H(A2|B1B2A1) ≤ b
implies H(A2|B2) ∈ {0, 1} ± a. This is exactly the setting posed in equation (2) of [9] for the
polarization of a single source polarization with side information. Hence, we set A1 = X[i] +X
′[i],
A2 = X
′[i], B1 = Z,X[S \ i] and B2 = Z ′,X ′[S \ i] and we can pick δ small enough to lower
bound (35) and show that H(X ′[i]|Z ′,X ′[S \ i]) ∈ {0, 1}±ε. From the chain rule, we conclude that
H(X ′[S]|Z ′)−H(X ′[S \ i]|Z ′) ∈ {0, 1} ± ε.
We then get the following using Corollary 1 and Lemma 5.
Corollary 2. With probability one, limk→∞ ηk[S] ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |S|}.
Finally, Lemma 3 and Corollary 2 imply Lemma 2. The next lemma proves the second item of
the theorem.
Lemma 6. For a random vector Y valued in Fm2 , and an arbitrary random vector Z, if
H(Y [S]|Z) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |S|} ± ε
for any S ⊆ [m], we have
H(
∑
i∈S
Y [i]|Z) ∈ {0, 1} ± δ(ε),
with δ(ε)
ε→0→ 0.
This lemma is proved in [2] as Lemma 7, we also provide a proof in Section 7. Denote by aS the
indicator vector of S, i.e., aS ∈ {0, 1}m with aS(i) = 1 if and only of i ∈ S, and denote by aSYj =∑
i∈S Yj[i]. Note that, if for two sets S, T ⊆ [m], we have H(aSYj|Z) ≤ δ(ε) and H(aTYj|Z) ≤ δ(ε),
then H(aSYj+aTYj|Z) ≤ 2δ(ε). Moreover H(aSYj+aTYj|Z) = H(aS+TYj|Z) ≤ 2δ(ε), where S+T
denotes the exclusive OR of the two sets. Hence the set of indicator subsets of [m] which have low
conditional entropy is a subspace of Fm2 . To keep notations compact, we can organize these subsets
in a matrix of rank at most m, i.e., for any j ∈ En, there exists a matrix Aj of rank rj, such that
H(AjYj|Y j−1) ≤ mδ(ε).
We now show how we can use this other characterization of the dependencies in Y to conclude a
speed convergence result. We first need the following “single-user” result, following the approach
of [5].
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Lemma 7. For any β < 1/2, ε ∈ (0, 1) and εn = 2−nβ , we have
1
n
|{j ∈ [n] : εn < H(
∑
i∈S
Yj[i]|Y j−1) < ε, for any S ⊆ [m]}| → 0.
Proof. We define the auxiliary family of random processes ζk[S], for S ⊆ [m], by
ζk[S] = Z(
∑
i∈S
V b1...bk [i]|V c1...ck ,∀(c1 . . . ck) < (b1 . . . bk))
where, for a binary uniform random variable A and an arbitrary random variable B, Z(A|B) =
2EB(P{A = 0|B}P{A = 1|B})1/2 is the Bhattacharyya parameter. Note that
Z(A|B) ≥ H(A|B). (36)
This follows from Proposition 2 in [9]. We then have, using the chain rule and source polarization
inequalities on the Bhattacharyya parameter, namely Proposition 1 in [9], that
ζk+1[S] ≤ ζk[S]2 if bk+1 = 1,
ζk+1[S] ≤ 2ζk[S] if bk+1 = 0,
and using Theorem 3 of [11], we conclude that for any α < 1/2
lim inf
ℓ→∞
P(ζk ≤ 2−2αk) ≥ P(ζ∞ = 0).
Finally, the conclusion follows from (36).
Finally, we have
1
n
|{j ∈ [n] :H(Yj [S]|Y j−1) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |S|} ± ε,∀S ⊆ [m],
∃Aj with rank(Aj) = int(m−H(Yj|Y j−1)),
H(AjYj|Y j−1) < εn}| → 1. (37)
This holds since the property that H(Yj [S]|Y j−1) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |S|} ± ε, for all S ⊆ [m], to-
gether with Lemma 6, imply that H(
∑
i∈S Yj[i]|Y j−1) ∈ {0, 1} ± δ(ε) with δ(ε) → 0 as ε → 0.
Let δ > 0 sufficiently small, and assume that H(
∑
i∈S Yj[i]|Y j−1) ∈ {0, 1} ± δ. Note that
H(
∑
i∈S1
Yj[i]|Y j−1) < δ and H(
∑
i∈S2
Yj[i]|Y j−1) < δ imply H(
∑
i∈S1+S2
Yj [i]|Y j−1) < 2δ, where
S1 + S2 is the disjoint union (or symmetric difference) of S1 and S2. Take now all subsets of
[m] for which H(
∑
i∈S Yj[i]|Y j−1) < δ, and create a matrix whose rows are the indicator vec-
tors of these subsets, and remove redundant rows to obtain an equivalent matrix Aj which must
have at most m rows. Then H(AjYj|Y j−1) < mδ (which is small since m is fixed). Moreover,
the rank of Aj , i.e., the number of non-redundant rows is determined as follows. Consider all
subsets T such that H(
∑
i∈T Yj [i]|Y j−1) > 1 − δ. Take now a basis for these subsets (i.e., as
before, a set of non-redundant indicator vectors for these subsets). The cardinality of this basis
must be the closet integer to H(Yj|Y j−1) (recall that H(Yj|Y j−1) is close to an integer), since
H(
∑
i∈S Yj [i]|Y j−1) ∈ {0, 1} ± δ for all S ⊆ [m]. Hence the rank of Aj must be the complement of
the closet integer to H(Yj|Y j−1), i.e., rank(Aj) = int(m−H(Yj |Y j−1)), where int(x) is the closest
integer to x. Finally, we need to ensure that the sums which are vanishing are indeed vanishing
fast, i.e., H(AjYj|Y j−1) < εn, but this follows directly from Lemma 7.
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5.2 Proof of Theorem 3
For j ∈ [n], the components to be decoded in Yj are not correctly decoded with probability
Pe(j) ≤ H(AjYj|Y j−1) ≤ εn.
Hence the block error probability is bounded as
Pe ≤
∑
j∈[n]
Pe(j) ≤ nεn,
and we obtain a block error probability of O(2−n
β
) for any β < 1/2.
Note that for a fix m, the complexity is O(n log n) by applying the same divide-and-conquer
factorization of the likelihoods as developed in [8], to our setting where the + and - operations are
over GF (2m) instead of GF (2).
The achievability of the sum rate is ensured by the second item of Theorem 2. We now show
the last part of the theorem. Assume that µ separable in S, then
nH(X1[S]|X1[Sc]) =
n∑
i=1
H(Yi[S]|Yi[Sc], Y i−1). (38)
To see this, assume w.l.o.g. that S = {1, . . . , k} for k ≤ m. Hence, Xn = [Xn[S],Xn[Sc]]. By
the separability assumption, there exist W1[S], . . . ,Wn[S] i.i.d. and F such that
Xn = [F (Xn[Sc]) +W n[S],Xn[Sc]], (39)
where F is applied component-wise. Hence
Y n = XnGn = [F (X
n[Sc])Gn + Z
n[S], Y n[Sc]] (40)
= [F (Y n[Sc]) + Zn[S], Y n[Sc]] (41)
where Zn =W nGn and where we used the fact F is linear in the last equality. Therefore,
H(Yi[S]|Yi[Sc], Y i−1) = H(F (Yi[Sc]) + Zi[S]|Yi[Sc], Y i−1) (42)
= H(Zi[S]|Yi[Sc], Zi−1[S], Y i−1[Sc]) (43)
= H(Zi[S]|Zi−1[S]) (44)
and
n∑
i=1
H(Yi[S]|Yi[Sc], Y i−1) =
n∑
i=1
H(Zi[S]|Zi−1[S]) (45)
= H(Zn[S]) (46)
= nH(W1[S]). (47)
Moreover,
H(X1[S]|X1[Sc]) = H(F (X1[Sc]) +W1[S]|X1[Sc]) = H(W1[S]). (48)
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5.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof of Theorem 4 for the polar-key-1 protocol. Let ε = 2−n
β
, (Xn, Y n)
iid∼ µ and let Un = XnGn,
V n = Y nGn. Let Uˆ
n be the output of the decoding algorithm in [9] run by Bob in possession of
Un[Rε,n(X|Y )] and Y n. From Theorem 3 in [9], P{Uˆn 6= Un} = o(2−nβ ). Hence the first claim in
the theorem. The only data communicated publicly in the protocol is Cn := U
n[Rε,n(X|Y )], and
under correct decoding, the key is
Sn = U
n[R1−ε,n(X) \Rε,n(X|Y )] (49)
= Un[R1−ε,n(X) \ (R1−ε,n(X|Y ) ∪∆ε,n(X|Y ))] (50)
where
Rε,n(X) := {i ∈ [n] : H(Ui|U i−1) ≥ ε}, (51)
Rε,n(X|Y ) := {i ∈ [n] : H(Ui|U i−1, V n) ≥ ε}, (52)
∆ε,n(X|Y ) := {i ∈ [n] : H(Ui|U i−1, V n) ∈ (ε, 1 − ε)}. (53)
Therefore
I(Cn;Sn) = I(U
n[R1−ε,n(X|Y ) ∪∆ε,n(X|Y )];Un[R1−ε,n(X) \ (R1−ε,n(X|Y ) ∪∆ε,n(X|Y )])) (54)
≤ I(Un[R1−ε,n(X|Y ) ∪∆ε,n(X|Y )];Un[R1−ε,n(X) \R1−ε,n(X|Y )]) (55)
≤ a(n) + b(n) (56)
where
a(n) := I(Un[R1−ε,n(X|Y )];Un[R1−ε,n(X) \R1−ε,n(X|Y )]) (57)
b(n) := I(Un[∆ε,n(X|Y )];Un[R1−ε,n(X)|Un[R1−ε,n(X|Y )]). (58)
Note that by the source polarization [9],
b(n) ≤ |∆ε,n(X|Y )| = o(n). (59)
Moreover, since R1−ε,n(X|Y ) ⊆ R1−ε,n(X),
a(n) = H(Un[R1−ε,n(X) \R1−ε,n(X|Y )]) +H(Un[R1−ε,n(X|Y )])−H(Un[R1−ε,n(X)]) (60)
≤ |R1−ε,n(X)| −H(Un[R1−ε,n(X)]) (61)
and
H(Un[R1−ε,n(X)]) ≥
∑
i∈R1−ε,n(X)
H(Ui|U i−1) ≥ (1− ε)|R1−ε,n(X)|. (62)
Hence, from (60) and (62),
a(n) ≤ ε|Rε,n(X)| ≤ εn.
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Finally,
H(Un[R1−ε,n(X) \Rε,n(X|Y )]) ≥ H(Un[R1−ε,n(X)]) −H(Un[Rε,n(X|Y )]) (63)
≥ (1− ε)|R1−ε,n(X)| − |Rε,n(X|Y )|
= (1− ε)(nH(X1) + o(n))− (nH(X1|Y1) + o(n)) (64)
= nI(µ) + o(n).
Since the secret-key cannot have entropy rate more than I(µ), the conclusion follows.
Proof of Theorem 4 for the polar-key-2 protocol. Let ε = 2−n
β
, (Xn, Y n)
iid∼ µ and let Un = XnGn,
V n = Y nGn. Let Uˆ
n be the output of the polar-matrix-decoder run by Bob in possession of
Un[Qε,n(X|Y )] and Y n. From Theorem 3, we have P{Uˆn 6= Un} = o(2−nβ ). Hence the first claim
in the theorem. The only data communicated publicly in the protocol is Cn := U
n[Qε,n(X|Y )],
and under correct decoding, the key is
Sn = U
n[R1−ε,n(X) \Qε,n(X|Y )] (65)
= Un[R1−ε,n(X) \ (R˜1−ε,n(X|Y ) ∪Ωε,n(X|Y ))] (66)
where
Rε,n(X) := {i ∈ [n] : H(Ui|U i−1) ≥ ε}, (67)
R˜1−ε,n(X|Y ) := {i ∈ [n] : Hi ∈ {(1, 0, 1), (1, 1, 2)} ± ε}, (68)
Ωε,n(X|Y ) := {i ∈ [n] : Hi /∈ Z3 ± ε}, (69)
Qε,n(X|Y ) := Ωε,n(X|Y ) ∪ R˜1−ε,n(X|Y ). (70)
Therefore
I(Cn;Sn) = I(U
n[R˜1−ε,n(X|Y ) ∪ Ωε,n(X|Y )];Un[R1−ε,n(X) \ (R˜1−ε,n(X|Y ) ∪ Ωε,n(X|Y ))]) (71)
≤ I(Un[R˜1−ε,n(X|Y ) ∪ Ωε,n(X|Y )];Un[R1−ε,n(X) \ R˜1−ε,n(X|Y )]) (72)
≤ α(n) + β(n) (73)
where
α(n) := I(Un[R˜1−ε,n(X|Y )];Un[R1−ε,n(X) \ R˜1−ε,n(X|Y )]) (74)
β(n) := I(Ωε,n(X|Y );Un[R1−ε,n(X)]|Un[R˜1−ε,n(X|Y )]). (75)
By Theorem 2,
β(n) ≤ |Ωε,n(X|Y )| = o(n). (76)
Moreover, since R˜ε,n(X|Y ) ⊆ Rε,n(X),
α(n) = H(Un[R1−ε,n(X) \ R˜1−ε,n(X|Y )])−H(Un[R1−ε,n(X) \ R˜1−ε,n(X|Y )]|Un[R˜1−ε,n(X|Y )])
(77)
≤ H(Un[R1−ε,n(X) \ R˜1−ε,n(X|Y )])−H(Un[R1−ε,n(X)) +H(Un[R˜1−ε,n(X|Y )]) (78)
≤ |R1−ε,n(X)| −H(Un[R1−ε,n(X)]) (79)
≤ εn. (80)
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Finally
H(Un[R1−ε,n(X) \Qε,n(X|Y )]) ≥ H(Un[R1−ε,n(X)]) −H(Un[Qε,n(X|Y )]) (81)
≥ (1− ε)|R1−ε,n(X)| − |Qε,n(X|Y )|
≥ (1− ε)(nH(X1) + o(n))− (n1
2
(H(X1) +H(X1|Y1)) + o(n))
(82)
≥ n1
2
I(µ) + o(n).
where (82) follows from the fact that a rate on the dominant face is achieved by Theorem 2, hence,
the gap between H(X1|Y1) and the achieved point on the dominant face is at least 12(H(X1) +
H(X1|Y1)), since we chose appropriately the role of Alice and Bob to maximize this gap.
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6 Appendix A: proof of Lemma 1
Let X,Y be two discrete random variables supported on X ,Y respectively. The lemma applies to
Y = f(X), but we write the proof for the more general setting. Upon observing Y = y, the estimator
of X which minizimes the probability of a wrong estimate is xˆ(y) = argmaxx∈X Pr{X = x|Y = y}
(i.e., MAP decoding), and the error probability is
Pe(X|Y = y) := 1−max
x∈X
Pr{X = x|Y = y}Pr{Y = y} = 1− e−H∞(X|Y=y). (83)
Averaging over the realizations of Y , and using Jensen’s inequality, yields an average error proba-
bility of
Pe(X|Y ) := 1−
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
Pr{X = x|Y = y}Pr{Y = y} ≤ 1− e−H∞(X|Y ). (84)
Note that for Y = f(X), where f : Fn2 → Fm2 , hence the above can be simplified to
Pe(X|f(X)) = 1−
∑
y∈Fm
2
max
x∈f−1(y)
Pr(X = x)
∑
u∈f−1(y)
Pr(X = u). (85)
If H∞(X|Y ) ≤ ε, then clearly Pe(X|Y ) ≤ 1 − e−ε = ε + o(ε), using MAP as the algorithm.
Conversely, if there exists an algorithm that has average error probability less than ε, then MAP
has average error probability less than ε as well, i.e.,
Pe(X|Y ) =
∑
y∈Y
(1− e−H∞(X|Y=y)) Pr{Y = y} ≤ ε. (86)
Defining F (y) = H∞(X|Y = y) and letting τ > 0, Markov’s inequality implies
Pr{1− e−F (Y ) ≥ ε/τ} ≤ τ (87)
hence, since H∞(X|Y = y) ≤ H0(X|Y = y) = m,
H∞(X|Y ) = EF (Y ) =
∑
y:F (y)<1−e−ε/τ
F (y) Pr{Y = y}+
∑
y:F (y)≥1−e−ε/τ
F (y) Pr{Y = y} (88)
≤ 1− e−ε/τ +mτ (89)
= ε/τ + o(ε/τ) +mτ. (90)
The conclusion is obtained by choosing τ =
√
ε/m.
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7 Appendix B: proof of Lemma 6
Let m ≥ 1, and let Z1, . . . , Zm be m random variables taking each value in F2 and such that
H(Z[S]) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |S|} for all S ⊆ [m]. Note that an assignment of (H(Z1),H(Z2),H(Z1, Z2))
in {0, 1} × {0, 1} × {0, 1, 2} determines an assignment of H(X1 +X2) in {0, 1}. In fact, assuming
H(Z1) = H(Z2) = 1 (otherwise it is trivial), it must be that H(Z1, Z2) is either 1 or 2. In the
first case, H(Z1|Z2) = 0 and Z1 is either equal to Z2 or its flip (Z2 + 1), i.e., H(Z1 + Z2) = 0. In
the second case, Z1 and Z2 are independent and H(Z1 + Z2) = 1. This shows that the entropy of
the sum of any two random variables is in {0, 1}. Consider now W1 = Z1 + Z2, W2 = Z3. Note
that H(W1,W2) = H(Z1 + Z2, Z3) takes values in {0, 1, 2}. In fact, since H(Z1|Z3) ∈ {0, 1}, Z1 is
either a function of Z3 or is independent of Z3, and similarly for Z2 and Z3 since H(Z2|Z3) ∈ {0, 1}.
Hence, it must be that H(Z1+Z2|Z3) is either H(Z1+Z2), H(Z1) or H(Z2), which are all in {0, 1},
and H(Z1 + Z2, Z3) = H(Z1 + Z2|Z3) + H(Z3) takes value in {0, 1, 2}. Therefore, we can apply
the same argument as above for Z1, Z2 to W1,W2 and H(W1 +W2) = H(Z1 + Z2 + Z3) ∈ {0, 1}.
Similarly, we get that the entropy of any sum of the Zi’s is in {0, 1}.
By the same argument, one obtains the result with a variable in the conditioning, i.e., if
X1, . . . ,Xm are m random variables taking each values in F2 and if Y is a discrete random variable
such that H(X[S]|Y ) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |S|} for all S ⊆ [m], then H(∑i∈S Xi|Y ) ∈ {0, 1} for all S ⊆ [m].
For example, the first argument in previous paragraph is as follows. If H(X1|Y ) = H(X2|Y ) = 1
and H(X1,X2|Y ) = 1, then H(X1|X2, Y ) = 0 and X1 is a deterministic function of (X2, Y ), or
equivalently, X1 and X2 can be determined form each other given Y . In other words, given Y ,
either X1 = X2 or X1 = 1+X2, hence H(X1+X2|Y ) = 0. If instead H(X1|Y ) = H(X1|Y ) = 1 and
H(X1,X2|Y ) = 2, then X1,X2, Y are mutually independent and each marginally uniform, hence
H(X1 +X2|Y ) = 1.
Finally, H(X[S]|Y ) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |S|}± ε implies H(∑i∈S Xi|Y ) ∈ {0, 1}± δ(ε) with δ(ε)→ 0 as
ε→ 0, follows by a continuity argument and the fact that m is fixed.
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